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Introduction
The management of migration is one of the most topical issues in current world affairs. The keen interest in migration policy has lead to a strand of economics literature on how migration policies are formed. Ethier (1986) , Bond and Chen (1987) , and Djajic (1989) were among the first scholars who studied specifically the management of migration inflows by the receiving countries. More recent contributions have been made, among others, by Woodland and Yoshida (2006) , Benhabib and Jovanovic (2007) , and Bianchi (2010) . 1 In this paper, we contribute to the research on the management of international migration by developing substantially the model of Stark and Wang (2002) . In that model, the level of human capital of migrants and non-migrants alike is affected by the migration policy. We relax two of the key assumptions of Stark and Wang (2002) : that the sending country alone wields the power to set the migration policy; and that the policy can be implemented costlessly. These assumptions do not seem to tally with a reality in which quite often neither the sending country nor the receiving country fully controls migration, and does so at no cost. To this end, we develop a two-country framework in which in terms of their level of human capital, workers within each country are ex ante (that is, prior to migration) homogeneous. We study how migration policies are determined when both countries wield power to set migration policies, and when controlling migration is costly. The policy instrument that we employ is a migration quota which, for a given number of workers in the sending country, corresponds to a probability of migration.
The received writings share the feature that the "quality" of each potential migrant, in particular his endowment of human capital, is taken as given and is orthogonal to (not determined endogenously by) the migration policy. This assumption does not seem to fit with a recent and fast evolving literature that maintains that under well specified conditions, the migration of human capital from a developing (sending) country to a developed (receiving) country enhances human capital formation and raises welfare within the sending country (Stark and Wang, 2002; Stark, 2007a, 2007b; Sorger, Stark, and Wang, 2011) . We contend that the formation of migration policies should better not be oblivious to the endogeneity of the human capital decision and to the dependence of that decision on those policies. 1 There is also a growing literature on the political economy of the determination of immigration quotas. The focus in that literature is on the perspective of the receiving countries. Examples are Benhabib (1996) , Facchini and Willmann (2005) , and Ortega (2005) . Razin et al. (2011) study migration policy restrictions in political-economic models when the destination country is a welfare state.
We model the 2 While receiving countries have lately focused on the development of screening policies in order to affect the skill-mix of the migrant inflow, migration quotas are also common. A striking example of a migration quota is the Green Card Lottery in the United States (United States Immigration Support, 2011) . Every year, the United States issues 50,000 Green Cards through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, which allocates visas randomly to prospective migrants on the basis of a computer-generated draw. Migration quotas are also common in EU countries. Boeri and Bruecker (2005) interaction between the two countries, first as a simultaneous non-cooperative game, and second as a sequential non-cooperative game. We also consider the endogenous emergence of bilateral agreements between countries. 3 We find that, in equilibrium, both the sending country and the receiving country can set the migration policy. We also find that bilateral agreements can arise as a welfare-improving mechanism. In addition, we show that the sending country can gain from migration even when the receiving country plays an active role in setting the migration policy, and when implementing that policy is costly.
We do so in two alternative settings: first, when the country that does not set the migration probability can nonetheless influence the equilibrium migration policy by resorting to the device of side-payments, which take the form of transfers for the support of control activities (say, funds for border enforcement); and second, when the two countries (Nash) bargain over the migration policy and over the sharing of the costs of implementing the policy.
Section 2 presents the benchmark model. Section 3 introduces the migration policy and establishes the equilibrium migration quota for a simultaneous game and a sequential game. Section 4 discusses bilateral agreements. Section 5 assesses whether under the equilibrium migration policy, the welfare of the sending country improves in comparison with the "no migration" situation.
Section 6 presents conclusions.
provide evidence of restrictions imposed by the old Member States on citizens of the new Member States during the transitional period in the wake of the two latest enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 . Restrictions applying to citizens of non-EU countries are also widespread, as documented, for example, by the ILO (2004) . These restrictions are often specific to certain sectors (agriculture in Austria, France, Greece, Portugal, and Sweden; tourism in Austria; and mining in France, Greece, and Portugal). Several receiving countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Switzerland) distinguish quotas according to the country of origin of the migrants, and on the basis of bilateral agreements. Several sending countries (including China) restrict issuing passports or granting exit visas so as to prevent (some of) their citizens from leaving. In China, in spite of a significant relaxation of migration controls in recent years, permission to leave the country may not be granted to those whose departure will, in the opinion of the competent department, be harmful to state security or cause major damage to national interests (cf. the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens, 1986) . More generally, the perception that it is the receiving countries that control incoming migration ("fix the migration policy") rather than the sending countries is often a myth. Spain has been at pains to forge an agreement with Senegal such that Senegal will curtail illegal migration to Spain, with Spain offering in exchange development aid and other financial incentives. Senegal will be allowed to grant a limited number of permits for Senegalese to work in Spain, and will otherwise exercise strict control over departures and cooperate fully in a swift repatriation of illegal migrants. (Similar pacts were made by Spain with Mauritania and with Morocco, for example.) Italy has had a similar agreement with Libya. The EU has been going out of its way to get sending countries in Africa to clamp down on EU-bound migration. The current (2011) preliminary talks between the EU and Tunisia's interim government on an agreement that will grant Tunisia preferential trade in return for a commitment to curb "irregular migration" is another illustration of the say that the sending country has in regulating migration flows. The US has long sought to have the Mexican government cap US-bound migration, essentially admitting that Mexico is as much in control of (illegal) migration to the US as is the US itself. Even in security-conscious Israel, it is Sudan rather than Israel that for the past few years has determined the (illegal) flow to Israel (via Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula) of thousands of its nationals. 3 Fernandez-Huertas (2008) shows that bilateral agreements can be mutually beneficial for the sending country and the receiving country. In his setting, however, the human capital level of each potential migrant is given and is exogenous to the migration policy.
The model
In this section, we present our basic model. We draw on, and adjust for our current purposes, the model of Stark and Wang (2002) . We consider a two-country world where, prior to migration, workers within each country are homogeneous. The assumption of a homogeneous workforce in the sending country is not critical however for the subsequent derivation of the results reported in the paper. In Appendix 1 we show that the equilibrium migration policies obtained in the homogeneous workforce setup are unchanged when there are two types of workers. Let
denote the probability that a worker in the sending country S migrates to the receiving country R. j N denotes the measure of the continuum of homogeneous workers in country
Workers produce a single commodity, the price of which is normalized at 1. Labor, measured in efficiency units, is the only factor of production.
In each country, the decision of workers how much human capital to acquire is undertaken in the presence of human capital externalities. Let the gross earnings in country j, 
In an Appendix available on request, we show that an alternative specification of the earnings functions of workers, based on an economy modeled along the lines of a CRS Cobb-Douglas production technology, yields the same essential results regarding the implications of a prospect of migration for human capital formation and for the average level of human capital in the sending country as the results obtained and drawn upon below.
To concentrate on essentials, we assume that the externality parameter η is constant and that it is the same in each of the two countries, whereas the private returns to human capital differ between countries.
4 4 Two features of the earnings function ( 1) merit comment. First, by including the economy-wide average level of human capital, we incorporate a measure of externality that captures spillover effects that accrue within the national economy. For a succinct review of evidence on geographical and intertemporal spillover effects of human capital, see Moretti (2005) . The externality assumption is common in the theoretical literature on endogenous economic growth, and it has recently been adopted to address the relationship between migration, human capital accumulation, and growth Stark, 2007a, Sorger, Stark, and Wang, 2011) . Second, the chosen functional form relies on a constant private returns parameter. This assumption is employed to facilitate tractability and is taken from Stark and Wang (2002 Differentiating (2) with respect to
Consequently, the optimal level of human capital of workers in country S is 6 paper, is that it provides a setting in which migration controls can be used as a "pure" policy instrument to restrict migration since in and by itself, migration is not restricted by decreasing marginal returns to human capital at destination. 5 Introducing a fixed cost of migration will not affect the individual's human capital formation decision. 6 The second-order condition for a maximum, Referring next to R, since, by construction, workers in R face a probability of migration 0 = m , their objective function is
and the first order condition for the maximization of their net earnings yields an optimal level of human capital
From a comparison of (4) and (6), and recalling our assumptions regarding , , and This observation is important since, as elucidated momentarily, it points to a drawback, from R's point of view, of R opening its borders to migration from S: the impact of such migration on R's welfare manifests itself through the effect of migration on the average level of human capital in R, and this effect is deleterious.
Forming a migration policy
In this section we study the interaction between S and R. In sub-section 3.2 we characterize this interaction as a non-cooperative game in which S and R set their optimal policies simultaneously, 7 The socially optimal level of human capital per worker in S in the closed economy setting, that is when m=0, is Stark and Wang (2002) . There, it is also shown that an appropriately chosen migration policy can bring the economy to the social optimum, substituting for human capital subsidies. 8 When doing so does not cause any confusion, we simplify the writing that follows by dropping the argument in * ( ) S m ϑ . 9 To see this, note that for 1 m < , and recalling that each taking the other's move as given. In sub-section 3.3 we study a non-cooperative two-stage (Stackelberg) game in which one country is the first mover, setting its optimal policy anticipating the best reply of the other country.
As already noted, the policy instrument that we study is setting a migration quota, M. Even though countries frequently employ both screening and quotas as migration policy instruments, in this paper we study the latter. As noted in the Introduction, quotas are practiced often. For a given size, S N , of the sending country's workforce, the setting of a quota M is equivalent to setting a migration probability for that country of
Undoubtedly, implementing a restrictive policy is costly. We assume that the cost of implementation is a function of the number of individuals that country S (R) wants to let out (in)
over the total number of potential out-migrants (in-migrants), which in turn represents the migration pressure that each country faces. We denote by ( ) j C m the cost of migration controls for country j, with j=S, R. Taking into account plausible differences between S and R in the technologies of control, this cost can well be country-specific. We assume that ( 0) 0, It stands to reason that if either of the two countries chooses a migration probability m, the probability space of the other is ] , 0 [ m : in a two-country world, emigration and immigration flows must be equal, and once one country chooses a probability level m, the other country cannot choose a less restrictive (that is, a higher) probability. We thus assume that the country that fixes the smaller migration probability will incur the control costs which, in per capita terms, are
11 10 The properties of this cost function are akin to those of the cost function used by Ethier (1986) , with the main difference being that here we allow for the enforcement of a closed economy policy. 11 However, the assumption that only one country at a time bears the migration control cost is relaxed in Section 4.
The resources required to implement the preferred migration policy are marshaled by levying a lump-sum tax on the country's native workforce. Therefore, ( ) j c m also denotes the per capita lump-sum tax. The assumption of a lump-sum tax implies that the decision to acquire human capital is not affected by the tax-based financing of the migration policy.
12
With regard to the choice of the migration policy, we assume that R cares only about the wellbeing of its own natives. As to S, its concern rests with the non-migrant members of its workforce, since the representative migrant worker who ends up subjecting his human capital to the ( ) mR S β β > productivity parameter (that is, to the superior R country technology) is clearly better off than an otherwise identical worker who stays behind in S. 13 The migration policy of country j is decided through maximization of the objective function
where
is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 when country j fixes the migration quota in equilibrium, and 0 otherwise. We use Prior to introducing the simultaneous and sequential game, we make several preliminary observations. These are pooled together in the following sub-section. 12 In equations (2) and (5) we did not include the lump-sum tax because at that point of the analysis, we did not as yet introduce migration policy choices. Given that the individual takes as given the migration probability m, inclusion of the lump-sum tax ( ) j c m will not affect the first order condition of the individual's optimization problem, however. 13 Stark and Wang (2002) discuss the choice of the objective function for the sending country. From Stark and Wang (2002) and from our discussion thus far we know that there is a threshold migration probability such that for quotas that entail a larger probability, non-migrants are actually worse off than when the quotas are set equal to zero; overinvestment in education can be detrimental to wellbeing. In such a case, in the wake of the migration opportunity the source economy will experience a reduction of welfare. However, as we show in Section 5, in equilibrium this possibility does not materialize.
Preliminary observations
Focusing first on country S, we note that its objective function, S S I G , depends on m both via the impact of the per capita cost of control, and via the optimal individual level of human capital and the average level of human capital. From (7) and (4), the objective function of country S is:
which captures that the government takes into account the externality in human capital accumulation and knows that
Differentiating (7a) with respect to m yields
The first of the two terms on the right hand side of (8) < . This probability also represents the equilibrium migration policy when S wields the exclusive power to set the migration policy, and when policy implementation is costless (cf. Stark and Wang, 2002) .
If 1 S I = , the optimal policy for S is
, where the subscript C stands for incurring the control cost. 14 The intuition for this result is straightforward: if migration controls are costly then, as already noted, the cost component becomes lower as m becomes larger. It is therefore beneficial to select a migration policy that is less tight. 
From (7), the objective function of country R (recalling that for the natives in R their individual optimal level of human capital does not depend on the migration opportunities) is thus
Differentiating (7b) with respect to m, we obtain
where, using (4) and (9),
From (11) we can see that migration has two opposite effects on R: a negative average human capital diluting effect, and a positive inducement effect. This can be discerned upon considering the first line of the right-hand side of (11). A higher m leads to a larger number of migrants (as can be gleaned from the first term in the numerator). The average level of human capital of these migrants is below the level of human capital formed by workers in R. Yet, a higher probability of migration increases the optimal level of human capital that workers in S choose to acquire and migrate with (this is the inducement effect, captured by the second term in the numerator).
If 0 R I = , the migration probability which maximizes (7b) is 0. If 1
can be a solution to the maximization problem, depending on the exogenous parameters of the cost function, and on the degree of transferability of human capital between the two countries. We consider the two corner solutions, 0 and 1, uninteresting, unrealistic, and hence we do not dwell on them. For an interior solution,
represents a global maximum if
: the first of these two inequalities arises from the limited transferability of human capital; the second follows from the assumptions regarding the parameters of the model. 
The simultaneous game
We here characterize the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous one-shot game. The best reply of country j is
where i=S, R, j i ≠ , and with
that is, j m  is the highest migration probability that equalizes the level of welfare in country j when it does not pay any migration control cost with the level of welfare that it achieves when it sets its optimal policy and pays the corresponding migration control cost.
If country i fixes a migration probability 
18
Proposition 1: The Nash equilibria of the simultaneous-move game are:
We now state and prove the following proposition. 
18 There are 24 (4!) potential orderings. Six of them are characterized by
Note that these last two inequalities are mutually exclusive once we take into account that  , respectively, and therefore, the best reaction of each country is to accept the preferred policy of the other country.
For reference in what follows, we note that the optimal migration probability that corresponds to Proposition 1 is In sum: Proposition 1 states that any of the two countries can be the equilibrium setter, highlighting the fact that assigning ex-ante exclusive power of setting the migration policy to either the sending country or to the receiving country, as is often assumed in the received literature, can be inappropriate.
The sequential game
We next characterize the equilibrium of the sequential game and identify the country that controls migration. We begin by considering the case in which the receiving country moves first and sets its optimal policy, anticipating the sending country's reaction.
Proposition 2:
The equilibrium migration probability, 
Proof: The receiving country R moves first and decides whether to set a migration policy, or to let the sending country S set the migration policy. In the latter case, the sending country will clearly choose its optimal migration policy . In this case, it is easy to see that R can reduce the loss it incurs by setting a more restrictive migration policy than that which is optimal for S, even though it has to bear the cost of control and therefore * R C m is the equilibrium.
In Figure 2 , we illustrate the case where and ) .
Proof: Consider the case where the sending country S moves first and decides whether to set a migration policy or to let the receiving country set the migration policy. In the latter case, the receiving country will clearly choose its optimal migration policy
 , the best strategy of the sending country is to set its control cost to 0, and to let the receiving country choose its own optimal policy As in the simultaneous game, both countries can be the equilibrium migration policy setters.
However, there is no more multiplicity of equilibria because the country that has the first-mover's advantage can avoid ending up in an equilibrium that accords it the lowest level of welfare.
We now have in place a foundation for analyzing cases in which the migration control cost is shared.
Bilateral agreements
Since the 1990s, there has been a global upsurge in bilateral agreements, as countries have come to realize that restricting migration is difficult, and that "cooperative migration management can better achieve goals for both sending and receiving countries" (ILO, 2004, 15-16). 20 In the preceding section, we considered a non-cooperative setting, and we presented the equilibrium migration policy, Bilateral agreements often go hand in glove with some burden-sharing between the sending and receiving countries, as exemplified by the monitoring of the regulations in the agreements, and by the management of the migration process (IOM, 2004) . * m , which is implemented by the country that consequently incurs the associated cost. In this section, we consider two other scenarios. In the first scenario, the country that does not set the migration probability can nonetheless influence the equilibrium policy by resorting to the device of side-payments. With the solution * m as a starting point, we study the possibility of the emergence of bilateral agreements on cost sharing, and we show how they can be rationalized. We assume that the possibility of side-payments opens up unexpectedly.
* m
In the second scenario, the two countries bargain over both the migration policy and the sharing of the costs of implementing the policy. We nest the problem in a Nash bargaining model where the threat points of the two countries, should they fail to come to an agreement, are identified by the welfare of the representative worker of country R and of the representative worker of country S at . An agreement between the two countries is binding.
In both scenarios, we consider a specific type of transfer between the countries, say funds for border enforcement.
Side-payments
We 20 In the European Union, there is no common migration policy regarding the nationals of non-EU countries, with the exceptions of refugees and asylum seekers (cf. the European Refugee Fund) and the intelligence-wise protection of the external borders (cf. Frontex). In the Communication of the European Commission (2008), the need for a common, comprehensive immigration policy has been recognized, and the basis for this stand has been laid down. Until such time that such a policy will be implemented, Member States will continue to resort to individual agreements with one or several sending countries. 21 This assumption guarantees that the simultaneous and the sequential games studied in the preceding section are immune to the possibility of potential side-payments. Therefore the outcome * m of the games is a proper starting point for our analysis. If side-payments could be anticipated, the optimal strategies of the receiving country and of the sending country in the determination of m will take this prospect into account ex ante. 
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Starting at 0 α = , the left-hand side of (19) captures the marginal benefit to country i. This benefit is conferred upon country i by a variation in the optimal policy of country j, in the wake of Thus far, our analysis shows that R can "seduce" S to limit migration: S is willing to trade off a more restrictive migration probability for a control cost subsidy, and R is willing to pay such a subsidy because the benefit that it stands to reap is larger than the cost that it has to bear. We note that if R N is large, side-payments are more likely to increase welfare (cf. equation (19)).
We consider next the case in which
, that is, the case when absent side-payments, the equilibrium migration probability is the probability that minimizes the welfare loss of R. In this case, can S resort to side-payments in order to tilt the equilibrium migration probability in its favor? < and therefore, S may find it attractive to resort to sidepayments in order to maximize its welfare, provided that condition (19) holds.
22
In sum, bilateral agreements on the sharing of border-control costs can emerge endogenously, and can be Pareto-improving.
A Nash bargaining solution
We next consider the case in which the two countries can jointly determine the division of the enforcement costs and the migration policy in a cooperative way. The objective function is given by the product of the utility surplus to country R and to country S from R and S of coming to an 22 Recall that if
then, in the absence of any side-payments, S fixes the migration probability at * * S C m m = , and we are back in the case that we have already analyzed (cf. the second paragraph that follows equation (19)).
agreement, compared to the disagreement point, with each surplus being weighted by the countries' bargaining power. As already noted, the threat points of the two countries, should they fail to come to an agreement, are identified by the welfare of the representative worker of country R and of the representative worker of country S at * m .
We first consider the case
The maximization problem is
where γ is the bargaining power of country R, and 1 γ − is the bargaining power of country S.
Taking logs of (20), differentiating with respect to and m α , and simplifying, we obtain the optimality conditions
where b denotes the bargaining solution, and where we make use of ( ) ( )
Equation ( optimal to decrease the migration probability as long as the total marginal benefit to country R outweighs the sum of the total marginal loss to country S and the marginal increase in the total costs of control.
Equation (22) equation (8) and the paragraph following equation (8) 
The interpretation of equations (23) and (24) When an endogenous formation of bilateral agreements is in evidence, it could serve as an indication that in order to secure welfare gains to both the receiving country and the sending country, the two countries are willing to make concessions in the form of policy adjustments.
A comment on welfare
In this section we ask whether the prevalence of a welfare gain to S, brought about by the prospect of migration as claimed by recent research of Stark and Wang (2002) , Stark (2007a, 2007b) , and Sorger, Stark, and Wang (2011) holds in a setting in which controlling migration is costly, and in which both S and R wield power to set the migration policy.
To this end, we have the following Corollary. 
Conclusions
We have shown how migration restrictions can arise in a non-cooperative framework, and that both the receiving country and the sending country can be the setters of the equilibrium policy. The observation that most migration restrictions are imposed by receiving countries can be rationalized within our model when we admit that the receiving country prefers levels of migration that are lower than those preferred by the sending country. This does not imply that the conduct of the sending country is immaterial: its actions constrain the actions of the receiving country. We have also identified instances in which bilateral agreements can arise as welfare-improving devices. We considered two cases: an agreement on side-payments, and a joint agreement on the migration policy and the cost-sharing of its implementation. Our analytical findings align with the observation that bilateral agreements often go hand in glove with some burden-sharing between the sending and receiving countries.
We have expanded the analysis of Stark and Wang (2002) to a setting in which the receiving country plays an active role in the determination of the migration policy, yet the implementation of the policy involves a cost. We have shown that even in such a setting, the sending country can still stand to benefit from its workers' decisions to acquire human capital in the presence of a prospect of migration. For the sending country alone to decide its migration policy (probability) is a sufficient condition for it to reap a welfare gain but, as we have shown, this is not a necessary condition. A welfare gain can be obtained by the sending country in a more realistic setting where the migration restrictions are set non-cooperatively in a game that allows both countries to have a say in the choice of the migration policy. More so if we allow for some degree of cooperation between the two countries.
Appendix 1
We consider a setup that differs from the one in the main text of the paper in that in terms of innate ability, the workers in each country are heterogeneous. For simplicity, we assume that there are two types of workers both in S and in R, and that they are equally represented in the S and R populations. Referring next to R, the objective function of an R country worker i is
and his optimal level of human capital is 25 We could just as well assume that the share of workers of one type is γ and the share of workers of the other type is 1 γ − . 26 The second-order condition for a maximum,
As in the case of a homogeneous workforce, we have that
The wellbeing of a non-migrant worker i in country S and of a native worker in country R can be written as net earnings minus the per capita control cost an expression that is akin to equation (11) in the main text.
Appendix 2
For the purpose of graphical representation, we make the following parameter assumptions: 
